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Abstract 
Previous studies on Turkey’s possible accession to the European Union have mostly 
focused on the level of support for membership as expressed by Turkish citizens. The purpose of 
this paper is to shed some light on the specific expectations and perceptions of the Turks about 
the EU membership process, focusing on economic development, democratic progress, economic 
and political stability, and cultural influence. In both the focus group studies and the final survey, 
the authors targeted people who have some knowledge about the EU accession process and EU 
membership, namely, academics and business people. 
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Introduction 
The European Union launched membership talks with Turkey on October 3, 2005, amid 
controversy. Despite the progress made in the formal path of accession, past and recent polls 
suggest in no ambiguous terms that sections of European public opinion hold strong reservations 
about the inclusion of this large country—with a population of 71 million, eight million more 
than France and only 10 million fewer than Germany—on a number of grounds, ranging from 
voting weight and cultural compatibility to relative levels of economic development. These 
reservations were largely reflected in the marathon dispute over the terms of the negotiation 
framework and are expected to influence the negotiation process, which is projected to take no 
less than a decade. During this process, should a new EU constitution be accepted, its form may 
render some of these questions moot. In order gain insight into these issues, this study provides 
an empirical specification of unofficial Turkish expectations and perceptions about EU 
membership. The findings are based on a survey. The questionnaire used addressed implications 
of prospective EU membership on a range of issues spanning from economics to cultural fit. 
Although the study took place in 2002, it represents a sincere attempt to benchmark and provide 
a background understanding of the ongoing situation. 
This investigation is important for a number of reasons. First, judgments about the 
pertinent issues are based more on speculation and stereotyping and less on sound knowledge 
about the Turkish context, political and social dynamics, and capacity. It is argued that an 
intimate look at the perceptions and expectations of Turkish citizens for EU membership may be 
useful in limiting speculative assessments about Turkey’s ability to reach EU standards on 
economic and political grounds as envisioned in the accession framework. Second, it is 
interesting to evaluate the Turkish perceptions in reference to the perceptions of the citizens of 
other countries prior to their entry.1 To this end, a two-stage investigation was staged. 
The first focus group was instrumental in developing the survey instrument used. Central 
issues were gathered from the discussion and incorporated into the questionnaire. The 
questionnaire includes items demanding feedback on the impact of EU accession on democracy, 
legal infrastructure, political stability, economy, and culture. While the inquiry is expected to 
shed light on the perceptions of Turks on all of these issues, of particular interest is the perceived 
impact on the business environment. Since the implications on the economy, legal infrastructure, 
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and political stability have direct bearings on the Turkish business environment, the survey 
results allow the evaluation of the perceived changes expected to occur in the business 
environment in the case of EU accession. 
The findings reveal that Turks are generally optimistic about the accession’s outcome for 
economic development, investments, and technological infusions. While respondents expect a 
fundamental transformation in political institutions, the democratic process, and rule of law, they 
do not find the EU process to be a politically stabilizing force. The results suggest some 
differences in perceptions across genders and age groups. While younger respondents and 
females are more optimistic about the impact of EU membership on democracy, older 
respondents are cautiously optimistic. Finally, the findings point to Turks’ fear of loss of 
traditional values and potential assimilation. 
The study proceeds as follows: the first section puts the work in perspective and provides 
a relatively detailed account of Turkish-EU relations. The second section analyzes potential 
implications of the accession process and EU membership on the Turkish political and economic 
environment. The third section briefly outlines the methodology, and the fourth section 
summarizes the survey findings. Finally, the fifth section concludes the study. 
 
Background 
The designation of Turkey as a candidate state for full membership in the European 
Union at the Helsinki Summit in 1999 intensified the debate about Turkey’s European identity 
and that country’s place in Europe. This debate has focused on European perceptions about 
Turkey rather than on Turkish perceptions of the EU. Indeed, there is little known about the 
unofficial posture of Turks regarding their government’s relentless pursuit of EU membership 
and its implications for Turkey. This study intends to fill this void by providing some insights on 
unofficial Turkish expectations and perceptions regarding EU membership through a survey. The 
survey addressed the implications of prospective EU membership on a range of issues spanning 
from economics to culture. 
Turkish intuition about the EU is nothing less than the culmination of a very intense 
interaction deepened by geography and a history spanning hundreds of years. Therefore, it makes 
sense to place the Turkish-EU relationship within this long historical context. This relationship, 
although overwhelmingly characterized as adversarial, also includes long cycles of collaboration 
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and cordial diplomacy in a never-ending geostrategic chess game. The case in point is the 
inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the 1856 Concert of Europe as a counterbalance to Russia.2 
While the Ottoman-European relationship is often viewed as adversarial, primarily due to 
seventeenth century wars and a large territorial loss for the Ottomans by the end of that century, 
the efforts of the Ottomans to institute Westernization projects in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries are largely ignored. The historical roots of Turkish modernization and Westernization 
projects that were rigorously pursued since the formation of the Republic of Turkey have been 
largely influenced by the legacy of the Ottoman efforts at Westernization.3 The founders of the 
new republic worked hard to establish that Turkey’s Westernization, and more specifically, its 
path to becoming European in the post-1923 modernization project was a continuation of an 
incomplete historical process whose failure had brought down the Ottoman Empire.4 
The leaders of modern Turkey embarked on a rigorous nationbuilding project with strong 
Western credentials by adopting the Swiss civil code, the Latin alphabet, and a host of other 
reforms aimed at delinking the new republic from its predominantly oriental-imperial heritage. 
They were given encouragement in their thinking that Turkey was European (or on its way to 
becoming European) when Turkey was admitted to several exclusively European and Western 
organizations such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
1948, the Council of Europe in 1949, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 
1952. In other words, there was significant reassurance that Turkey should continue on its stated 
path of becoming part of the community of Europe. Ironically, the strongly rooted heritage of 
this doctrine, which put Turkey vehemently onto a path of Westernization, is now criticized by 
Europeans as “alien to Western liberal democracy.” Furthermore, Europeans claim that Turkey 
engenders domestic political practices in conflict with core European democratic norms.5 
The quest for external validation of its European credentials and its desire to participate 
in a community of Europeans eventually led Turkey’s leaders to apply for membership to the 
European Economic Community in 1959.6 After the signing of the association agreement (the 
Ankara Agreement) in 1963, which included a promise of full membership to the European 
Community at a later date, Walter Hallstein, president of the European Commission, declared 
that Turkey was part of Europe.7 The Ankara Agreement envisioned a three-phase integration 
process through which both sides would make mutual trade concessions and Turkey would adapt 
its external tariffs to match those of the EC. The terms of the Ankara Agreement were modified 
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in 1970 by an additional protocol that diluted the ultimate goal of membership to a customs 
union by the end of 1995. 
The process set forth in the Ankara Agreement could have potentially culminated in full 
membership by the 1970s, when Greece made its application for full membership, as argued by 
Ziya Öniş.8 However, defensive posture and the reluctance of the Turkish political elite, who 
thought that acceleration of the integration process would expose Turkish industry to premature 
competition from Europe, resulted in the eventual self-exclusion of Turkey from the membership 
process. By late 1970s, the possibility of the early accession of Greece to the European 
Community, coupled with serious consideration of the inclusion of Spain and Portugal, led to 
increased concerns in Turkey, and the idea of applying for full membership gained increasing 
support. Amid growing domestic economic and political upheaval and opposition by the Islamist 
National Salvation Party, the application process was delayed, to the detriment of Turkish 
membership ambitions. In hindsight, it is plausible to argue that the Turkish political elite’s 
miscalculation of the potential implications of Greece’s full membership played a significant 
role, and Turkey missed a major opportunity by not applying for full membership at the same 
time as Greece. 
The 1980s represent a significant shift in the EU-Turkish relationship and mark a very 
different set of dynamics than those of the 1970s, due to a number of factors. First, the military 
intervention on September 11, 1980, interrupted an already fragile democracy in Turkey, and the 
Turkish-EU relationship entered an official standstill until the election of a civil government in 
1983. Although a gradual democratization process started with the 1983 elections, it was subject 
to substantial restrictions. The bans on political parties and prominent politicians, oppression of 
civil and political rights under the newly drafted constitution, and the lack of civilian control 
over the military undermined Turkey’s democratic credentials. During the post-1983 period, the 
resurrected but fragile Turkish democracy faced two fundamental challenges, in the form of 
Kurdish separatism and political Islam. On the economic front, Turkey abandoned its import 
substitution development efforts and opted for an open, outward-oriented export promotion 
development model by implementing far-reaching reforms with financial and technical 
assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The economy’s response to reforms was 
positive. The most remarkable change in the Turkish economy was seen in its external sectors. 
Turkey’s manufacturing exports grew 51 percent in 1981 and doubled by 1985 in real terms.9 
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This shift in the Turkish economy also changed Turkish attitudes toward the European 
Community. With a more open economy and a substantially stronger industrial base, Turkey no 
longer displayed a defensive and timid attitude toward the EC, which had characterized its 
approach to integration opportunities in the 1960s and 1970s. In spite of the rising tensions 
between Turkey and the EU because of Turkey’s democratic deficit, their relationship in the 
post-1983 period improved markedly. Prime Minister Turgut Özal perceived this momentum to 
be an opportunity and applied for full membership despite discouraging signals from his 
European counterparts. 
During this period, Europe was also going through a significant transformation. On the 
economic front, the lack of progress in the integration process prompted a comprehensive review 
of the state of union, which culminated in the Single European Act of 1987. The depth of the 
integration was pronounced far stronger than in earlier periods, and a massive economic policy 
coordination effort was undertaken by the members. On the political front, attention shifted from 
recognition of nominal democracy to an emphasis on the quality of democracy and human rights. 
Both the political and economic parameters of the EC in 1980s were dramatically different than 
in the 1970s, when Turkey had had its first encounter with the EC. During the post-1980 period, 
the EU tended to place much more emphasis on the political factors and shortcomings of Turkish 
democracy in contrast to earlier periods, when the primary emphasis was always the 
development gap and the weakness of the Turkish economy. 
Another important factor that emerged as a significant influence on the EU-Turkish 
relationship in the 1980s was Greece’s role as an insider of the EC with veto power. A striking 
example of this role was the blockage of a 1.5 billion euro financial package to support Turkish 
adjustment. 
Öniş argues that the significance of the changes in the EU throughout the 1980s and the 
potential role of Greece as an insider was not fully comprehended or appreciated by Turkish 
politicians and public opinion.10 It appears that the Turkish application for EU membership in 
1987 gave little consideration to these new dynamics. 
The opinion presented by the European Commission in 1989 in response to the Turkish 
application was a decisive rejection on the grounds that Turkey met neither political nor 
economic criteria for membership.11 Instead of considering Turkey for full membership, the 
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commission verified the eligibility of Turkey and suggested the activation of the Customs Union 
agreement. 
Resurrection of the Customs Union agenda overlapped with significant political 
developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. According to some observers, the 
collapse of the Communist bloc and the end of the Cold War structures undermined Turkey’s 
strategic importance and eroded the logic for Turkey’s inclusion into the European order. An 
alternate view is that Turkey now had new geostrategic importance under the newly shaped 
conditions. At the New Atlantic Initiative (NAI) Congress held in Istanbul in early May 1998, 
the consensus view by Western diplomats was that with the emergence of Central Eurasia as a 
conceptual entity—one of the most volatile and energy-rich regions of the world—Turkey’s 
strategic role had become more important than ever before.12 It is argued that the steadfast 
embrace of the Central and Eastern European countries’ bid for membership ahead of Turkey is 
living proof of the changing European attitudes towards Turkey.13 
Although it was seen merely as an interim step toward full membership, the Customs 
Union agreement that became effective in January 1996 was an important step for Turkey. 
Despite the arguments that the terms of the Customs Union were not based on sound economic 
analysis, it served as a powerful external anchor in the implementation of some regulatory and 
structural reforms.14 
Ironically, in the years following the implementation of the Customs Union, the Turkish-
EU relationship evolved strenuously and resulted in the de facto isolation and exclusion of 
Turkey. As the EU pursued Eastern European enlargement under German influence and 
sponsorship, the view that the boundaries of the EU should end at Turkey’s borders has gained 
weight within the Union. Although it was implicit in EU public opinion, the tendency to exclude 
Turkey from the EU as a country outside European Christian culture gained political ground, and 
this view has even been occasionally voiced by representatives of EU organs.15 During this 
period, Turkish public opinion’s skepticism about EU membership clearly increased and 
dramatically weakened the political platforms supporting political and economic reforms in 
pursuit of EU membership. The perceptions of exclusion and isolation and the sense of 
frustration with European attitudes towards Turkey reached their climax with the Luxembourg 
Summit in December 1997. The Luxembourg Summit shaped the future enlargement of the EU 
and named the countries eligible for membership that would join the European Union in two 
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stages. Turkey, however, was excluded from the enlargement process at a time when Central and 
Eastern European countries emerged as official candidates for full membership. 
The Luxembourg Summit came very close to permanently damaging the EU-Turkish 
relationship. The Economist concluded that the Luxemburg rebuff was ill-judged and should 
have been amended as quickly as possible to avoid a historical mistake.16 With a strong dose of 
American encouragement, both parties engaged in rounds of intense diplomacy to control the 
damage. A sign of hope emerged at the EU Summit in Cardiff on June 14, 1998. At the Cardiff 
Summit, the document entitled “European Strategy for Turkey,” which had been adopted by the 
European Commission on March 4, 1998, was renamed “Strategy for Preparing Turkey for 
Membership.”17 This was largely interpreted as a positive development by the Turkish 
government.18 
Efforts to repair the relationship gained momentum as social democratic governments 
came to power in major EU countries. This change in the political structure of the EU has 
somewhat reduced the influence of the thesis of “cultural and religious differences,” which 
gained widespread support among European conservatives and Christian Democrats. At the same 
time, it has opened the way to introducing a concrete schedule for Turkish membership and the 
possibility of defining Turkey as among the countries of the second enlargement process. A shift 
in the European political environment, diplomatic efforts, and a striking change in the Greek 
attitude towards Turkey—encouraged by reciprocal aid in the wake of earthquake damage and 
Greece’s embarrassment in light of its role in sheltering Abdullah Öcalan19 after his ouster from 
Syria—culminated in a new lease of life for Turkey-EU relations at the Helsinki Summit of 
December 1999. At this critical juncture, the EU offered explicit candidate status to Turkey, 
which generated considerable optimism on the Turkish front. The immediate effects of the EU 
announcement of Turkish candidacy-closer relations with the EU and rapprochement with 
Greece-were very clear. These developments created a favorable environment for the 
implementation of a major stabilization program with structural components. 
Announcement of Turkey’s candidacy represents a very significant turning point not only 
in the bitter relationship between Turkey and the EU but also in Turkish domestic politics. It 
placed the Copenhagen criteria20 as an indisputable economic and political anchor before Turkey 
and clearly conditioned Turkish access to the fulfillment of these criteria. This external anchor 
has defined the Turkish governments’ domestic agendas since then and provided them with the 
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leverage to deal with political and bureaucratic resistance to change. The momentum gained in 
Helsinki transformed into a national program that set the path towards compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria, consisting of revolutionary changes in otherwise recalcitrant Turkish 
politics and equally dramatic reforms in the economic environment. Although Turkey has a long 
way to go, Turkish performance attained toward fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria has been 
surprising. A series of reforms adopted by the two successive governments led Turkey to 
forcefully seek a date for accession negotiations by the end of 2003 at the Copenhagen Summit 
of 2002. The Turkish demand was rejected by the European Commission on the grounds that 
Turkey had still not fully met the Copenhagen criteria. However, intense negotiations during the 
course of the summit meeting culminated in a compromise decision to start accession talks with 
Turkey “without delay” if the European Council summit in December 2004 could reach a 
decision that Turkey met all the Copenhagen criteria. 
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in Turkey kept the prospect alive 
with a remarkable legislative agenda in 2003, which focused on the political criteria. Since the 
conclusion of the Copenhagen Summit in 2002, four legislative packages have been passed by 
the parliament, consisting of reforms addressing critical issues ranging from freedom of 
expression to restricting military control over the controversial National Security Council. The 
November 5, 2003 EU commission report emphasized the impressive strides Turkey has taken 
toward achieving compliance with the EU political criteria and praised the adoption of the last 
two reform packages; however, the report cautioned Turkey about implementation and the 
practical effects of the reforms.21 Turkish efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria gained further 
momentum in 2004, and the Turkish parliament has passed highly controversial legislation 
bolstering democracy and human rights. The decision to start accession negotiations in 
December 2004 culminated with the official launch of the talks on October 3, 2005. As was 
outlined in the introduction of this essay, the accession process is expected to be long, rigorous, 
and arduous. While management of this process will be a delicate task that will require much 
sophistication with an amalgam of technical, political, and diplomatic skills, it is beyond the 
scope of this study to delve into these issues. 
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Potential Implications of EU Accession on the Turkish Environment 
The Turkish political and economic environment has been evolving at its own pace for 
almost two decades. In the political sphere, Turkey has been struggling to establish its fragile 
democracy amid internal and external pressures for further and faster democratization. In the 
economic sphere, the momentum of the early 1980s was lost by the end of that decade, and 
imprudent macroeconomic policies implemented by numerous coalition governments did not 
bring the stable growth Turkey much needed. While macroeconomic instability clouded the 
vision of the investors, overwhelming inflation, unbearably high interest rates, mounting budget 
deficits, and spiraling government debt distracted policymakers’ attention from strengthening the 
institutions of the market that Turkey had started to build as early as the 1980s. The need for 
sweeping structural change was not addressed until a crisis-driven attempt to overhaul the 
economy in 1999 in the context of a standby agreement with the IMF. This attempt also 
overlapped with the ratification of Turkey’s candidate status for EU accession in December 
1999. Although this initial reform effort was interrupted by a devastating financial crisis in 
February 2001, its main pillars were carried out with further reinforcements to date. 
It is argued that the implications of Turkey’s EU accession for its political and business 
environment go far beyond the typical “economic integration” case for a number of reasons. 
First, Turkey is already integrated into the EU through its trade and investment linkages.22 In 
other words, typical pre-integration barriers are already to a large extent removed in the EU-
Turkey case, as Turkey has had a customs union with the EU since 1995. Second, as briefly 
summarized above, Turkey has been struggling to reform its political and economic environment 
for almost two decades, primarily through internal pressure, with the exception of reforms 
imposed by multilateral organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. Even in cases where 
the pressure for reform has come from multilateral organizations, it has proven to be difficult to 
overcome the domestic resistance to change. The sounding evidence of this is the failure of the 
17 stabilization programs on which Turkey embarked over the last two decades. All 17 of these 
programs were dismantled by the government under intense domestic pressure. A parallel case 
can be made for the political reform efforts in Turkey. Radical progressive democratization 
efforts were bogged down by the powerful establishment. 
It is also argued that EU accession provides a strong external anchor to reform-minded 
politicians to pursue their reform agendas simply because their program offers a clear 
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endgame—EU membership. The impact of having unambiguous targets with an unambiguous 
endgame has brought significant momentum to Turkish reforms since 2000. When EU member 
states agreed with the Turkish government on an accession partnership in December 2000, the 
Turkish government launched a “National Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis” in March 
2001. In this context, Turkey achieved significant strides towards compliance with the 
Copenhagen criteria on political and economic grounds. 
The focus group interviews confirm the authors’ projections that EU accession will bring 
decisive changes to the Turkish political and business environment. The respondents’ 
perceptions indicate that the impact of possible EU accession for Turkey will be profound for the 
business climate. Furthermore, the focus group interviewees anticipate unequivocal improvement 
in the democratic credentials of the country, political stability, significant reforms in the legal 
system, further embrace of the rule of law, an improvement in the education system, 
macroeconomic stability, technological progress, economic growth, and higher living standards. 
The respondents also indicate that increasing stability, economic growth, and higher 
living standards coupled with regulatory changes and convergence to EU standards in democratic 
practice will increase the credibility of the country and encourage business to engage more 
robustly with Europe. Respondents’ perceptions suggest that accession to the EU will strengthen 
the market infrastructure, dramatically increase capital inflows to Turkey, and energize economic 
growth. A common perception among the respondents is the significance of legal reforms in the 
accession process, which will strengthen the frail legal infrastructure and provide a level playing 
field for business. A parallel argument suggests that corruption will be tainted by the 
establishment of a rule of law, which will improve resource allocation significantly. 
Respondents indicate that they expect increasing competition and improvements in 
product and service quality. A clear beneficiary of this process is thought to be the exporting 
industries. Several respondents argue that EU-driven energy and agricultural policy changes will 
also have a positive impact on the economy. Another important point that is emphasized is the 
expected positive impact of accession on tourism and related service sectors. The impact of 
technological upgrades through foreign direct investments, defensive restructuring of local 
companies, joint ventures, and other forms of collaborations are emphasized in the discussion. 
An interesting point is the expected decline in military expenditures. Most respondents argue that 
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this would further increase the resources available to productive sectors and contribute to a 
renewed focus on business. 
 
Methodology 
The focus of this study is Turkey. As a first step, two separate focus group studies were 
conducted to identify the major issues to be included in a survey. For the focus groups, people 
familiar with EU-related issues regarding Turkey’s potential membership were selected. The first 
group consisted of academics that have expertise in the subject matter, and the second group 
comprised business people who, again, were familiar with the issues. The topics list that guided 
the discussions is contained in the Appendix. 
The focus group study of academics was conducted in July 2002 with a group of faculty 
and graduate students from the Center for Research and Application on the European Union 
(ATAUM) at Ankara University. A similar study was conducted in Istanbul in August 2002 with 
a group of business people familiar with EU-related issues. The discussions were taped and 
subsequently transcribed. 
Analysis of the content of the discussion transcripts enabled the identification of some 
insights on issues of concern related to business, economic, political, social, and cultural matters. 
These were distilled into key dimensions that underpinned the design of a web-based research 
instrument. A sample of these issues is included in the Appendix. The research instrument 
reflects these preliminary insights. Through the Turkish associates at the Center for Research and 
Application on the European Union and at Antalya Akdeniz University, as well as business 
contacts in Turkey, a sizable sample (500+) drawn from the target groups of informed 
individuals was contacted: these included graduating classes of graduate and undergraduate 
economics and business students and business executives. The contact was made by authoritative 
figures connected with these institutions. The key parties agreed to cooperate. They contacted the 
target audience via email, urging the recipients to explore a hyperlink that would take them to the 
research instrument on the New York-based website. In this way, the data at the point of location 
were collected, and an analysis of the attitudes of electors was performed accordingly. The 
survey response rate was about 20 percent. 
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Parallel to this, an analysis of the literature was performed in order to obtain a 
genealogical appreciation of the issue and the key epochs and events that may influence 
attitudes. It is against this background that the interpretations of the attitude measures are made. 
 
Survey Results 
The findings of the survey represent an attempt to measure and record Turkish 
perceptions of membership to the EU at a specific moment in time. There were 93 responses to 
the online survey. As was stated previously, the target groups for this survey were primarily 
academics and business professionals (both in the public and private sectors). Well known 
standard statistical techniques were employed. Through factor analysis, each category (i.e. 
democracy, rule of law, political stability, international credibility, economic development, and 
culture) was reduced to a single factor or dimension to facilitate analysis and discussion. Several 
two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA, a method of comparison to see whether populations 
genuinely differ) tests were done using these factors (i.e. dependent variables). Characteristics 
such as “gender/age,” “income/job/education,” and “job sector/ industry/foreign trade 
involvement” were set as independent variables. In other words, two-way ANOVA analysis 
helps in assessing the effects of each factor (for example, age, gender, and so on) and the 
interaction between those factors on the issue that is being discussed (for example, rule of law, 
credibility, and so on). The following is a summary of the general characteristics of the 
respondents. 
Respondents were asked to answer questions in six broadly defined categories, including 
the impact of possible accession to the EU on the development of the democratization process, 
the embrace of the rule of law, political stability, international credibility, economic 
development, and culture. Each category included three to eight specific questions exploring 
various aspects of the particular category. 
Clearly, there is a perception that EU accession will have a positive impact upon the 
business environment. This is especially so insofar as respondents gauge that it will aid 
democratization, help improve transparency, and ingrain the rule of law. 
Responses to statements related to democracy show that a large majority (62-90 percent) 
of the respondents either agrees or strongly agrees with the fact that EU accession will help 
improve the democratization process in Turkey. The only exception to this is the statement on 
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the EU’s role in the cultivation of a culture of tolerance among social, political, ethnic, and 
religious groups. Only 55.4 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that EU will help 
this cultivation process. Respondents may see this as a long-term process rather than something 
that will happen right away with the accession. It is also possible that respondents may not share  
the view that EU itself has been successful in establishing a culture of tolerance and respect to 
diversity. This might be particularly related to European reactions to Turkish membership on 
cultural grounds, the Kurdish question, or other issues that have not been considered. 
A further analysis of the responses suggests that younger respondents (aged 45 and 
younger) are more sanguine about the impact of EU accession on the democratization process. A 
brief look at the responses by gender indicates that female respondents are more optimistic than 
male respondents. A combined analysis of gender and age groups suggests that male respondents 
between the ages of 45 and 54 are less optimistic than the other groups. The differences in 
perception across age groups can perhaps be attributed to life experiences. It is possible that 
respondents between the ages of 45 and 54 are more familiar with the history of Turkey-EU 
relations; due to many setbacks and disappointments they might feel less optimistic about the 
road ahead. The gender differences in perceptions can partly be attributed to the support 
expected from the EU process toward the emancipation of women. It is possible that female 
respondents are associating the democratization process with rights for women. Future 
qualitative research into these questions might inform the issue further. 
In contrast to expectations, the analysis suggests that the perceived optimism about the 
impact of EU accession on the democratization process declines as the education level of the 
respondents rises. This might reflect the shared pessimism of highly educated individuals about 
the effectiveness of a superimposed democratization process as opposed to grassroots 
movements or merely a widespread cynicism among these groups. The respondents employed in 
the education and manufacturing sectors, and in particular self-employed groups, have a less 
favorable perception of the possible democratization impact of EU accession. Interestingly, 
public sector employees are among the most optimistic about the democratization impact. This 
may be attributed to the prospects about much needed public sector reforms to be undertaken in 
the accession process targeting efficiency, higher standards of transparency, and government 
accountability.23 
Table 1. General Characteristics of the Respondents 
• 81 percent are in the 25–45 age group 
• 66 percent are male, 33 percent female 
• 68 percent of the respondents’ net annual income is between $8,400 and $42,000 
• 71 percent of the respondents have a bachelor’s or master’s degree 
• 72 percent of the respondents are employed in the private sector, 17 perce t in the publi  
sector, 6 percent are self-employed, and 3.2 percent are students 
• 84 percent of the respondents are employed in services sectors (banking, education, and 
other), 16 percent are employ d in the manufact ring sectors 
• 62 percent of the respondents are midlevel managers and technical staff, 13 percent have 
administrative and executive roles 
• While 39 percent of the resp ndents are employed in firms and instituti ns with no dire t 
involvement in exports and imports, 61 percent of the respondents are employed in firms 
with some involvement in international trade 
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Similarly, slightly higher percentages (70-88 percent) indicate that respondents agree or 
strongly agree that EU accession will help speed up the reforms in the legal system and help 
improve the rule of law in the country. The responses to the rule of law category exhibit similar 
patterns to the impact of democratization. While younger, better educated, and female 
respondents perceive that EU accession will strengthen rule of law, 45-54-year-old male 
respondents are less optimistic or moderately optimistic about the impact. Therefore, gender, 
age, and gender/age together (i.e. GENDER*AGE) play a salient role in the perception of the 
outcome. Results of the two-way ANOVA analysis given in Table 2 support this (that is, the 
values in the last two columns corresponding to the rows “GENDER,” “AGE,” and 
“GENDER*AGE” show that these factors are significant). The respondents with administrative 
responsibilities have a stronger perception that EU accession will enhance establishment of the 
rule of law. 
Responses to statements on political stability are not as positive as the responses 
discussed above. Although about 80 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that EU 
accession will minimize the potential for disruptions in democracy, and 73 percent agree that it 
will limit the role of the military in the political system, the impact of EU accession on other 
issues related to political stability is not seen as strong. For example, only 54.4 percent of the 
respondents agree or strongly agree that EU accession will bring overall political stability to 
Turkey, and only 43 percent agree or strongly agree that EU accession will reduce polarization in  
 
Table 2. Testing the Relationship between the Factor “Rule of Law” and Various  
Characteristics (Dependent Variable: Rule of Law Factor) 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
       
Corrected Model  
Intercept  
GENDER  
AGE  
GENDER*AGE  
Error  
Total  
Corrected Total   
15.8071 
2.332 
5.467 
9.905 
8.853 
65.009 
80.929 
80.815 
  8 
  1 
  1 
  4 
  3 
68 
77 
76 
1.976 
2.332 
5.467 
2.476 
2.951 
0.956 
2.067 
2.440 
5.718 
2.590 
3.087 
0.051 
0.123 
0.020 
0.044 
0.033 
0.196 
0.035 
0.078 
0.132 
0.120 
       
1R2 = 0.196 (adjusted R2 = 0.101).      
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Turkish politics and strengthen the center-right and center-left parties. This may reflect the 
inherent tension about the overall direction of the country. 
While a considerable percentage of the population perceives Westernization and 
modernization as a threat to traditional values in a predominantly Muslim society, at least an 
equally large portion of society identifies these forces with economic and social progress. The 
EU accession process and possible membership will lend overwhelming support to the latter and 
will tip the balance in no ambiguous terms. This projected shift in social and economic dynamics 
is not expected to come without political ramifications. Emergence of a reactionary rather than a 
conciliatory political dynamic—regardless of the political anchor imposed by the EU accession 
process—is not a far-fetched possibility. The respondents’ perceptions may just reflect 
possibilities of such internal confrontations in domestic politics. However, it should be 
emphasized that this process is not necessarily perceived to be politically destabilizing, as 
responses to a related question suggest. 
While the younger and more educated respondents are more optimistic about the positive 
institutional impact of EU accession on the political system, they are less sanguine about its 
impact on ideological convergence or the depolarization of Turkish politics. As is observed in 
other categories, older respondents do not share the optimistic perceptions of the younger 
respondents that EU accession will improve political stability in Turkey. Additionally, 
executives, midlevel managers, and administrators have a more optimistic perception of the 
impact of EU accession on the political stability than other professional categories. 
The low percentage of positive perceptions regarding the impact of EU accession on 
political stability is in line with the low percentage seen for the cultivation of a culture of 
tolerance, which is discussed above. On the other hand, a majority of the respondents does not 
see EU accession as a potential factor that will increase political instability in Turkey. (Only 39 
percent of the respondents agree that it will increase political instability.) It is interesting to 
observe that even though EU accession is not viewed as a factor that will improve political 
stability, it is not viewed as a source of instability either. 
With respect to the credibility issue, a majority agrees or strongly agrees that EU 
accession will improve Turkey’s credibility both in the region and in the world (75-86 percent). 
However, there is one discrepancy: 82.6 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree that 
EU accession will enhance Turkey’s credibility because of improved political and economic  
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Table 3. Testing the Relationship between the Factor “Credibility” and Various  
Characteristics (Dependent Variable: Credibility Factor) 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
       
Corrected Model  
Intercept  
GENDER  
AGE  
GENDER*AGE  
Error  
Total  
Corrected Total   
15.5801 
6.254 
0.832 
12.270 
3.703 
65.544 
81.237 
81.124 
  7 
  1 
  1 
  3 
  3 
71 
79 
78 
2.226 
6.254 
0.832 
4.090 
1.234 
0.923 
2.411 
6.774 
0.901 
4.431 
1.337 
0.028 
0.011 
0.346 
0.007 
0.269 
0.192 
0.087 
0.013 
0.158 
0.053 
       
1R2 = 0.192 (adjusted R2 = 0.112).      
 
stability, even though, as is discussed above, a majority does not see EU accession as a source of 
political stability. A closer look at this paradox suggests that the perceived optimism about the 
impact of EU accession on the credibility factor is relatively lower among the middle-aged to 
older age (35-54) respondents. Table 3 indicates that age is a significant factor in the perception 
of credibility that Turkey would gain in the case of accession to EU. Also, self-employed people 
with a higher educational background are less optimistic about the impact of EU accession on the 
credibility factor. As observed before, the respondents from banking and other services were 
markedly optimistic about the impact. This might be related to the interpretation of the term 
“credibility.” While bankers may associate credibility with widely recognized indicators such as 
Euromoney or Institutional Investor country rankings or metrics such as sovereign spread, other 
professional groups may perceive credibility as international prestige or influence. It is widely 
expected that Turkey’s standing in terms of credibility measured by these metrics will increase as 
long as Turkey remains on course toward final accession. On the other hand, Turkey’s 
international economic and political influence, as well as prestige within and outside of the EU, 
is a relatively uncertain prospect. The mixed results observed may be attributed to this 
dichotomy.24 
With respect to economic issues, a majority thinks that EU accession will help Turkey 
achieve macroeconomic stability and growth (about 82 percent). It is interesting that an 
overwhelming majority (94.6 percent) agrees or strongly agrees that EU accession will cause 
large-scale corporate restructuring in response to EU competition. Although a majority agrees or 
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strongly agrees that the impact of EU accession on Turkish firms will vary depending on the size 
of the companies, there is almost an even split on whether small and midsize firms will 
experience a negative impact in the short to medium term. Expectations of a positive impact on 
the large firms, however, are supported by only 62 percent of the respondents. A similar result is 
also observed with respect to the agricultural sector; about 62 percent of the respondents agree or 
strongly agree that EU accession might have a negative effect on the agricultural sector, at least 
in the short term, due to EU standards that member countries have to meet. With respect to the 
rate and intensity of technology acquisition, the responses are overwhelmingly positive; that is, a 
majority (81.5 percent) either agrees or strongly agrees that EU accession will help in this regard. 
As in other categories, younger respondents are more optimistic about the impact of EU 
accession on economic growth than the other categories of respondents. 
Somewhat surprisingly, regarding the economic sentiment factors, the older respondents 
are more optimistic towards EU accession. Further analysis into the economic growth factor 
indicates that self-employed respondents and respondents working in the education industry are 
less optimistic because they believe that EU accession will not contribute to economic growth. In 
contrast, respondents in midlevel administrative jobs are more optimistic in this regard. With 
respect to the economic sentiment, the more educated respondents believe that EU accession will 
bring a positive thrust to the Turkish economy. Table 4 supports this, indicating that the  
Table 4. Testing the Relationship between the Factor “Economic Sentiment” and Various  
Characteristics (Dependent Variable: Economic Sentiment Factor) 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
       
Corrected Model  
Intercept  
INCOME 
EDUCATION 
JOB LEVEL 
INCOME*EDUCATION 
INCOME*JOB LEVEL 
EDUCATION*JOB LEVEL 
INCOME*EDUCATION*JOB LEVEL 
Error  
Total  
Corrected Total   
41.6711 
0.155 
5.144 
16.680 
6.824 
5.205 
3.826 
3.548 
1.011 
38.460 
80.916 
80.132 
33 
  1 
  5 
  4 
  4 
  5 
  4 
  5 
  2 
45 
79 
78 
1.263 
0.155 
1.029 
4.170 
1.706 
1.041 
0.957 
0.710 
0.505 
0.855 
1.477 
0.182 
1.204 
4.879 
1.996 
1.218 
1.119 
0.830 
0.591 
0.111 
0.672 
0.323 
0.002 
0.111 
0.316 
0.359 
0.535 
0.558 
0.520 
0.004 
0.118 
0.302 
0.151 
0.119 
0.090 
0.084 
0.026 
       
1R2 = 0.520 (adjusted R2 = 0.168).      
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Table 5. Testing the Relationship between the Factor “Economic Growth” and Various  
Characteristics (Dependent Variable: Economic Growth Factor) 
 
 
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
 
df 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
Eta 
Squared 
       
Corrected Model  
Intercept  
JOB SEC 
INDUSTRY 
FT 
JOB SEC*INDUSTRY 
JOB SEC*FT 
INDUSTRY*FT 
JOB SEC*INDUSTRY*FT 
Error  
Total  
Corrected Total   
26.6091 
0.126 
8.452 
1.508 
0.560 
0.755 
6.699 
3.767 
0.000 
44.782 
71.401 
71.391 
24 
  1 
  2 
  3 
  4 
  1 
  3 
  7 
  0 
47 
72 
71 
1.109 
0.126 
4.226 
0.503 
0.140 
0.755 
2.233 
0.538 
 
0.953 
1.164 
0.132 
4.435 
0.528 
0.147 
0.793 
2.344 
0.565 
0.321 
0.718 
0.017 
0.666 
0.963 
0.378 
0.085 
0.781 
0.373 
0.003 
0.159 
0.033 
0.012 
0.017 
0.130 
0.078 
0.000 
       
1R2 = 0.373 (adjusted R2 = 0.052).      
 
education factor is significant. As seen before, the respondents with more international trade 
involvement are more optimistic towards the economic implications of EU accession. Results in 
Table 5, corresponding to factors of job security (JOBSEC) and job security together with 
foreign trade (FT) (i.e. the row for “JOBSEC*FT”), indicate that in the case of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU, job security and job security together with foreign trade will have a 
significant impact on economic growth. 
In a 2005 interview, the then French president Jacques Chirac demanded that Turkey go 
through a cultural transformation to become an EU member. While the fabric of this comment is 
not entirely clear, it is an indication of the projected cultural implications of the EU accession 
process on Turks and Turkish culture. While Chirac might have alluded to a shift in mindset, 
cultural ramifications of Turkish integration are by no means insignificant. Culture here refers to 
the sum of socially transmitted behavior patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products 
of human work and thought, together with the predominant attitudes and behavior that 
characterize the functioning of a group—in this case, Turks. Responses received on the culture-
bound questions are mere reflections of the magnitude and complexity of the issue and suggest 
serious concerns on the Turkish end. For example, only about 58 percent of the respondents 
agree or strongly agree that Turkish culture will not be negatively affected due to EU 
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membership. “Negative” in this context implies cultural intrusion or domination of EU values 
over traditional Turkish values. More specifically, it implies some form of assimilation and loss 
of distinct cultural identity. While this might be comforting for Europeans, some Turks are 
deeply concerned about it. Interestingly, Turks are optimistic about European attitudes towards 
Turkish culture. Two-thirds of the respondents view acceptance of Turkish cultural differences 
by the EU to be likely. Fusion of Turkish cultural mores with European values is expected. 
Further in-depth analysis revealed that the “45 to 54” age group had the most pessimistic view 
with respect to cultural impact, as they believe that Turkish culture will be negatively affected by 
the consequences of EU membership. Executives, midlevel managers, and technical staff, as well 
as those with more than a 75 percent involvement rate in foreign trade, were less concerned 
about the cultural intrusion threat; they believed that the EU accession would not dilute Turkish 
culture. 
 
Conclusion 
The survey employed indicates that the respondents generally confirm the belief that EU 
membership will transform the Turkish economic, political, legal, and sociocultural structures. 
However, respondents see this as a gradual process that is likely to take place over a long 
timeframe. Generally, respondents are optimistic about the impact of the process on economic 
development and expect that EU membership will improve economic activity and living 
standards through investments and technological infusions. While respondents expect 
fundamental changes in political institutions and an improvement in democracy and rule of law, 
they do not find the EU process to be a politically stabilizing force. Respondents are in 
agreement on the impact of the EU process in further instilling the rule of law and in improving 
the legal infrastructure. The results of the survey suggest some differences in perceptions across 
genders and age groups. While younger respondents and females are more optimistic about the 
impact of EU membership on democracy, older respondents are cautiously optimistic. Finally, 
the respondents are somewhat concerned with the cultural implications of EU membership. 
There is a fear of loss of traditional values and potential assimilation. 
Turkey’s EU membership will continue to be a challenging agenda item both in EU 
member countries and in Turkey. The merits of Turkey’s membership will also be debated both 
in Turkey and in the EU. Recent studies evaluating the inclusive stance set convincing arguments 
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yet to be heard and digested by EU politicians, public opinion leaders, and the general public.25 
European concerns about Turkish membership will remain based on Turkey’s capacity to 
develop high standards in the practice of democracy, establish the rule of law in economic and 
social life, and foster sustained economic development that will afford Turkey the ability to close 
the vast income gap with the EU. Europeans are also concerned about political instability in 
Turkey and its neighborhood and fear that the EU will be drawn into inherent regional conflicts 
around the eastern and southeastern borders of Turkey. Given the polar views over the accretion, 
understanding the public perceptions and concerns is paramount for successful management of 
the process. 
 
Notes 
1. EU public support for enlargement was strong at 60 percent or more, according to a Gallup 
poll. Even in enlargement-skeptic countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Britain, the pros 
outweighed the antis by two to one. Again, in contrast to the Turkish case, it was the 
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candidates, April 2002 figures showed the pros at 50 percent or less. That is still well ahead 
of the antis. 
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Common Market Studies, Vol.41, No.3 (2003), p.495. 
6. Some ardent commentators on Turkey suggest that this move was primarily motivated by a 
desire to match the Greek application at the time and was not an integral part of a long-haul 
strategic political and economic vision. 
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18. The interpretation by Foreign Minister İsmail Cem is revealing. His interpretation was that 
Turkey was considered a candidate among the 12 countries with the UK formula presented in 
Cardiff. See Sen, “Turkey and the European Union.”  
19. Abdullah Öcalan was the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) until he was 
captured in Kenya in February 1999. Portrayed as a Marxist-Leninist organization by its 
leadership, the PKK has launched an armed struggle for an independent Kurdish state in the 
southeast of the country since 1984. 
20. The Copenhagen criteria specifies fulfillment of three conditions: first, stable institutions to 
guarantee democracy, rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities 
(political criterion); second, a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the EU’s internal market (economic criterion); 
and lastly, the ability to take on all the obligations of membership, i.e. the entire body of EU 
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law and policy known as the acquis communautaire, and adherence to the aims of political, 
economic, and monetary union (acquis criterion). 
21. EU Commission Press Room, November 5, 2003. 
22. Turkey’s success in coping with a customs union that lifted the last restrictions on industrial 
and processed agricultural products with the EU in 1996 shows how the country has been 
able to rise to the European challenge. Turkey has even narrowed its trade deficit with 
Europe, with exports covering four-fifths of imports, compared with two-thirds in 2002. 
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bureaucratic EU and its current members. 
24. A case in point is the Cyprus conflict. There are scores of politicians and public opinion 
leaders arguing that the EU prospect limits Turkey’s diplomatic options and forces it to 
submit to an EU-dictated solution. 
25. Two such recent studies are notable. See: K. Barysch, S. Everts and H. Grabbe, “Why 
Europe Should Embrace Turkey?” Center for European Reform (CER), London, 2005; and K. 
Hughes, “Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?” Friends of Europe, 
Working Paper, June 2004.
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Appendix A. Focus Group Discussion Topics 
 
Impact on the Political Sphere 
Democratization and strengthening of civil society organizations 
Resolution of representation problems (e.g. ethnic groups) 
Debate on the role of the military and possibly emergence of a redefined role 
Associations with EU organizations 
Direct representation in EU governance bodies 
Foreign policy/subordination to EU-level policies 
Dealing with and resolving foreign issues (e.g. would have to follow the EU 
decisions—advantages vs. disadvantages) 
Turkey’s role in its region as an EU member 
Increasing power of radical right-wing parties within EU countries 
Future structure of EU is still not certain 
 
Business and Economic Sphere 
Macro 
Macroeconomic stability enforced by EU-level fiscal and monetary rules 
Development support from EU 
Foreign direct investment 
Economy-wide productivity improvements 
Turkey, as a member of the EU, will help the EU expand its economic market beyond 
Europe (e.g. ex-Soviet Turkic Republics, Middle East) 
 
Micro 
Corporate restructuring/strategic response 
Impact on large firms (short-term vs. long-term) 
Impact on medium and small firms (short-term vs. long-term) 
Wages and employment 
Technological upgrade 
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Legal Structure 
Reform in the dysfunctional and corrupt legal system 
Deepening of rule of law 
Assertion of property rights, effective resolution of economic and civil conflicts through 
courts, further development and enforcement of contract law 
Further development of regulatory law 
More disciplined society (i.e. rules of law will dominate politics, economy, etc.) 
 
Social Sphere 
Overall increase in living standards 
Reduced/increased ethnic tension 
Resolution or sharpening of tension between pro-Western and Islamic-orientedpolitical 
and social groups will have mirror affect on the political sphere 
Income distribution 
Corruption 
Articulation, increased awareness, and assertion of citizenship rights (civil rights) 
Lack of desire of the society as a whole to learn more about the EU 
What it means to be a member of EU 
 
Cultural Sphere 
Increased interaction with EU countries through intensified political, educational, and economic 
linkages 
Revisions and innovations in the education system—a more positive exposure to the 
EU 
Positive feedback from similar efforts in the EU 
Testing historically claimed “tolerance” 
The impact of EU’s capability to embrace Turkey 
European identity as an upper-level (umbrella type) identity 
Cross-cultural influence between the EU and Turkey 
How receptive would the EU be toward Turkish culture? 
